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Unexpected Convergence:
Values, Assumptions, and the Right to Strike
in Public and Private Sectors, 1945-2005
JOSEPH A. MCCARTINt
Significantly, James B. Atleson opened his path-
breaking book Values and Assumptions in American Labor
Law by addressing "the right to strike," and its "false prom-
ises and underlying premises."' With his opening sentences
he cited the Supreme Court's decision in the 1938 case of
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Company,' in which
the majority held that nothing in the recently enacted Na-
tional Labor Relations Act should be construed to deprive
an employer in a strike of "the right to protect and continue
his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers."3
Atleson went on in his first chapter to explain that these
lines inserted in dicta, which had no direct bearing on the
disposition of the case, lines that were little noted at the
time they were delivered but became crucial to the later de-
velopment of labor law and the constriction of union power,
spoke to a "historical continuity of values reflected in judi-
cial opinions" in which judges granted special deference to
"productivity, hierarchical control, and continued produc-
tion."4 In the immediate wake of the Wagner Act's passage,
Atleson made clear, judges were already moving to restrain
expressions of labor solidarity that threatened employers'
freedoms, reaffirming values that sharply eroded the act's
ability to actually foster union organization as its preamble
made clear it was intended to do.' It was from looking at the
courts' treatment of the right to strike that Atleson took his
t Associate Professor of History, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
1. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 19
(1983).
2. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
3. Id. at 345.
4. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 33.
5. Id. at 19-33.
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bearings on the values and assumptions that informed
American labor law-and rightly so, for no aspect of labor
law better reveals the general orientation of that law than
its position on the most elemental confrontation between
workers and employers: the strike.
Even as Atleson wrote these words, the enormous im-
portance of the Mackay doctrine was only just beginning to
be understood. That doctrine, which lay for decades like an
unexploded bomb under the foundations of U.S. labor rela-
tions, went off with tremendous force just when Atleson was
preparing his book for publication. The size of the explosion
could not have been predicted even five years earlier. For,
although the Mackay decision had explicitly recognized the
right of employers to permanently replace strikers in eco-
nomic strikes, prominent examples of employers utilizing
this right were few before the 1980s.6 Large employers were
generally reluctant to be seen as breaking strikes, and thus
dividing communities. To be sure, as Michael LeRoy has do-
cumented, the use of permanent replacement workers began
to rise in the late 1970s. 7 But it was not until President Ro-
nald Reagan's firing of more than 11,000 highly trained air
traffic controllers forty-eight hours into their 1981 strike
that the permanent replacement tactic became fully legiti-
mized and began to assume a central role in American labor
relations! Once Reagan permanently replaced the striking
members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organi-
zation (PATCO) and showed that the public would support
such an action, a number of prominent private sector em-
ployers followed suit.9 In the 1980s, Phelps-Dodge, Grey-
hound, International Paper, Hormel, and others imitated
Reagan's example. The results were disastrous for labor. By
the end of the century, the strike-workers' most reliable
tool of leverage-was disappearing from labor's arsenal.
During the 1950s, the United States averaged more than
350 major work stoppages-defined as conflicts involving at
least 1,000 workers for one day. In the new millennium,
that annual average dropped to under twenty-five. The
6. Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker
Replacements: Empirical Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16
BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 169, 176 (1995).
7. Id. at 178.




power imbalance between employers and striking workers
that the Mackay doctrine anchored firmly in law helped de-
termine this outcome, and its impact began playing out
even as Atleson drafted his book, in which he presciently
cited that doctrine as the preeminent example of the values
and assumptions embedded in American labor law.
Yet it is important to note that the PATCO strike,
which helped activate the latent power of the Mackay doc-
trine, was an illegal strike of federal workers-employees of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).0 Because it
was a public sector strike, it was not governed by the body
of law derived from the Wagner Act, or the subsequent deci-
sions of the National Labor Relations Board, which were the
focus of Atleson's research. Significantly, Atleson himself
did not interrogate the values and assumptions of public
sector labor law at all in his account. His book concerned
private sector labor law only. Thus, there was no need for
him to consider the PATCO strike, the implications of which
put the Mackay doctrine into stark relief even as he sent his
book to press. Atleson's focus on the private sector in his
important book made perfect sense. It would have been im-
possible to adequately treat both public sector and private
sector labor law in a volume that aimed to revise our under-
standing of the assumptions that lay at the base of labor
law. Public sector labor law developed along a different
track, without a unifying national structure like the Wagner
Act, and thus resisted the sort of probing analysis that Atle-
son brought to bear in examining private sector labor law."
Yet, if the decision to treat the history of private sector U.S.
labor law apart from the history of its public sector counter-
part was understandable when Atleson was pioneering a
new approach to the history of U.S. labor law in the 1980s,
10. See United States v. Prof'l Air Traffic Controllers Org., 525 F. Supp. 820
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
11. Atleson was not alone in this. The other legal scholars who joined him in
fleshing out a fresh approach to the history of labor law in the 1980s-
Christopher Tomlins, Karl Klare, and Katherine Van Wezel Stone among
them-also ignored public sector labor law in their seminal works. See generally
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985); Karl E.
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); Katherine Van




it makes less sense now, more than twenty-five years after
the appearance of Atleson's seminal book. For reasons that
have become clearer since the publication of Values and As-
sumptions, continuing to treat public and private sector la-
bor law separately causes us to miss an important truth. As
the rise of post-PATCO strike-breaking in the private sector
demonstrated so clearly, developments in one sector could
have enormous impacts in the other.
In what follows, I would like to argue three interrelated
propositions. First, that the history of private labor law over
the past half-century cannot be properly understood without
appreciating its relationship to public sector labor law.
Second, that the law's position on the right to strike-which
Atleson used as an approriate gauge of the law's underlying
assumptions-is the best terrain upon which to examine
exactly how closely intertwined public and private sector
labor dynamics were in the half-century after World War II,
and remain to this day. And third, that the relationship be-
tween public and private sector labor law and practice be-
tween 1955 and 2005 complicates the view of labor law that
Atleson offered in 1983, confirming some aspects of his
groundbreaking argument, while inviting a revision of oth-
ers.
I develop these arguments by briefly tracing the rela-
tionship between public and private sector labor law and
practice regarding the right to strike across three distinct
periods. During the first period, the years between 1945 and
the mid-1970s, I argue that developments in the private
sector contributed to the increasing liberalization of the
strike right in the public sector in ways that James Atle-
son's work does not prepare us to understand. In his analy-
sis of the Mackay doctrine, Atleson held that the Supreme
Court intended to "balance" labor's right to strike against
the employer's right to operate in order to check the strike
weapon with the counter weapon of striker replacement. 2 In
inventing such a balance, Atleson contended, the court in
effect ruled that "the employer's interest is sufficient to de-
stroy the statutory right to strike. .... "13 To be sure, Atleson
made a compelling case for the disempowering impact of
this "modern emphasis on 'balancing' of conflicting inter-




ests" on workers and unions in the private sector. 14 But, as
viewed from the perspective of public sector workers in the
first three decades after World War II, the "balancing" im-
perative identified by Atleson takes on a very different sig-
nificance. If, in the private sector, the "balancing" notion
functioned to weaken the strike weapon, the reverse was
true in the public sector during this period. Public sector
workers and their allies repeatedly cited the private sector
model and the importance of "balancing" power between
workers and employers in order to win more liberal laws
and practices, and to justify their strikes, whether they
were waged legally or, as was usually the case, illegally.
During the second period-the tumultuous years be-
tween 1975 and 1981-I argue that developments in the
public and private sector intersected in a different way.
During these years, the labor relations patterns that had
taken shape during the previous decades in both the public
and private sector began to break down under the combined
weight of soaring inflation, de-industrialization, deregula-
tion, and the first effects of a new wave of global economic
integration, among other causes. Amidst this crisis, efforts
by some in Congress to reform labor law in both public and
private sectors failed, and employers in both sectors began
to adopt a more confrontational approach to labor relations.
In many ways, public sector employers led the way in this
turn toward confrontation. It was they, more than their pri-
vate sector counterparts, who normalized strike-breaking as
a way of dealing with labor disputes, thus unleashing the
latent power of Mackay. Ronald Reagan was scarcely alone
in contributing to this development; Democratic politicians
also played a key role in the story.
During the third period, after 1981, patterns in public
and private sector law and practice converged once again,
but in a different way than unionists had once hoped. Hav-
ing seen public sector employers help lead the way in the
normalization of striker replacement, private sector em-
ployers followed suit in the 1980s, invoking their Mackay
rights, breaking a series of prominent strikes, and often ex-
plicitly acknowledging Ronald Reagan as their inspiration.
As a result of employers' new aggressiveness and the in-
creasingly unfavorable tilt in the terrain of political econo-




meted. By the early twenty-first century, an ironic develop-
ment was clear. Although private sector strikes were still
"legal," their use had become nearly as infrequent as public
sector strikes had been in the post-World War II era when
such strikes were illegal in all jurisdictions.
I. THE PULL OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR MODEL: LEGITIMIZING
THE PUBLIC SECTOR STRIKE, 1945-75
When the Supreme Court was promulgating its Mackay
Doctrine, public sector workers in the United States did not
enjoy the right of collective bargaining, let alone the right to
strike. The disastrous Boston Police Strike of 1919 had cut
short a movement to organize public sector workers during
the World War I era, and, according to Joseph Slater,
helped create "a central, ongoing, and debilitating fact of life
for public sector unions" and "an almost complete lack of
legal rights."'5 Nor was there much hope of government
workers reversing this trend during the New Deal era-not
if Franklin D. Roosevelt had anything to say about it. Roo-
sevelt believed that "militant tactics have no place in the
functions of any organization of government employees."16
In his mind, the idea that government workers ought to en-
joy the same rights as private sector workers, including the
right to strike, was simply "unthinkable and intolerable." 7
The courts agreed with Roosevelt. In the 1943 case of Rail-
way Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, New York's Supreme Court held
that merely to "tolerate or recognize any combination of...
employees of the Government as a labor organization or un-
ion is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy,
but inconsistent with every principle upon which our Gov-
ernment is founded."'
8
15. JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE
LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 71 (2004). For a discussion of the impact of
the Boston Police Strike, see id. at 13-38.
16. STERLING D. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 2 (S. Ill. Univ. Press 1972)
(1948).
17. Id. Unions did obtain collective bargaining in isolated pockets of the
federal government, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. See generally
MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & MICHAEL D. ROGERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: THE TVA EXPERIENCE (1977).
18. Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know 'What a Labor Union Is".
How State Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector
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In the immediate aftermath of World War II there was
no sign that this broad animus toward public sector unioni-
zation or strikes would abate any time soon. Indeed, when
some public sector workers dared to join the post-war strike
wave, they paid a high price for their actions. When 2,400
Buffalo teachers walked off their jobs seeking higher pay on
February 24, 1947, they surprised city and state officials
and won significant raises after defying firing threats and
remaining "absent from work" for one week. 9 But their vic-
tory triggered a political backlash. Prodded by Governor
Thomas E. Dewey, the New York State Legislature passed
the Condon-Wadlin Act just weeks after the Buffalo wal-
kout. The New York law provided for the automatic dismis-
sal of public sector strikers." Seven other states passed sim-
ilar laws in 1947, including Ohio's Ferguson Act and Michi-
gan's Hutchinson Act.2" Congress also weighed in. In 1946, a
Democrat-controlled Congress rushed through Public Law
419, which made it illegal for Congress to use federal funds
to pay any employee who belonged to an organization "as-
serting the right to strike against the United States," and
required employees to sign an affidavit denying their mem-
bership in such organizations.22 The following year, the Re-
publican-controlled 80th Congress included an explicit ban
on strikes by federal workers in the Taft-Hartley Act.23 As
Allan Weisenfeld observed, the law in these years tended to
regard government workers' strikes as "akin to treason."24
Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981, 981 (2000) (quoting Railway Mail Ass'n v.
Murphy, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (1943)).
19. Buffalo Corporation Counsel Fred C. Maloney announced the strikers had
abandoned their positions and could be dismissed without a hearing. The
teachers called their action not a "strike," but an "abstention from work."
Benjamin Fine, Buffalo Teachers Paralyze Schools in Strike Over Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1947, at 1; see also Buffalo Teachers End Their Strike on Pay
Rise Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1947, at 1.
20. Dewey Bill Ousts Public Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1947, at 1; see also
Leo Egan, Bill to Bar Strikes by Public Workers Goes to Governor, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1947, at 1.
21. Gordon T. Nesvig, The New Dimensions of the Strike Question, PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 126, 129 (1968).
22. SPERO, supra note 16, at 28.
23. Id. at 29.
24. Allan Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16
LAB. L.J. 685, 686 (1965).
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Yet, despite the galvanization of legal penalties and po-
litical opposition to public sector strikes after World War II,
something remarkable happened over the next twenty
years: government workers began to win collective bargain-
ing rights at the federal, state, and local level. As they did,
they increasingly defied the laws that denied their right to
strike, in some cases winning de facto recognition of that
right-which led employers to refrain from pursuing the
penalties prescribed by law-in others winning reductions
in the penalties against striking, and in a few settings
achieving outright legalization of strikes. Public sector
workers made these gains in part by claiming that the "bal-
ance" that labor law had claimed to create between employ-
ers and workers in the private sector had not only enhanced
the citizenship of private sector workers, it had also led to
increased productivity and labor peace. If the private sector
model were transferred to the public sector, they argued, it
would both lead to more efficient and responsive govern-
ment and end the public sector employees' status as "second
class citizens. 25
For government workers to effectively make such argu-
ments, however, required two prerequisites: the stabiliza-
tion of private sector labor relations after World War II and
the routinization of the private sector strike. By the mid-
1950s, private sector labor relations had taken on a degree
of stability and predictability it lacked during the turbulent
1930s and in the postwar battles when unions and employ-
ers still probed the contours of collective bargaining. The
meaning of industrial democracy, once a malleable and con-
tested term, had begun to narrow to the point where it sig-
nified nothing more than collective bargaining, and its
fruits-increased wages and benefits, seniority systems, and
grievance structures-and bargaining itself had begun to
settle into predictable patterns. Unions had grown more bu-
reaucratic, Communists had been purged from their leader-
ship, and the once antagonistic AFL and CIO had moved
toward unity. Yet these developments, which historians of-
ten point to as evidence of labor's dissipation, scarcely sig-
naled any reluctance by unions to strike. To the contrary,
25. For a useful treatment of the changing law and way of thinking about
government strikes, see generally Kurt L. Hanslowe & John L. Acierno, The




the 1950s proved to be the most strike-prone decade, as
Jack Metzgar reminds us. The records for the highest an-
nual number of major strikes and number of striking work-
ers recorded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics were set in
1952; and the record for worker-hours lost due to strike ac-
tion was set in 1959.26 Yet, the 1950s strikes generally dif-
fered from those of previous decades in one important re-
spect: since employers rarely engaged in the sort of strike-
breaking activities that had aroused the interest of the La-
Follette committee in the 1930s, strikes were less violent. 7
Indeed, strikes had become increasingly routine conflicts.
This, in turn, opened the door to a reconsideration of unio-
nization and collective bargaining in the public sector.
As the 1950s began, a growing number of voices began
to compare public sector labor relations unfavorably with
those in the private sector. Some of those voices came from
unlikely quarters. The Hoover Commission report on the
organization of the executive branch, for one, faulted the
federal government for having "lagged behind American in-
dustry in improving employer-employee relations."2 A grow-
ing chorus chimed in. In his 1952 book, The Unfinished
Business of Civil Service Reform, William Seal Carpenter
argued that "the merit system benefits from support and
criticism by alert employee groups."29 It was counterproduc-
tive to treat government employees as "a class of political
eunuchs," Carpenter argued, since "[l]oyalty is not a product
of coercive measures."3 He insisted that problems in the
employer-employee relationship in the public sector could be"solved only by patient negotiation among all parties con-
cerned."'" In 1955, a special committee of the American Bar
26. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WROK STOPPAGES
INVOLVING 1,000 OR MORE WORKERS, 1947-2008 (2008) http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/wkstp.t01.htm. On the largest strike of the strike-prone 1950s, see
JACK METZGAR, STRIKING STEEL: SOLIDARITY REMEMBERED (2000).
27. For background on the LaFollette Committee, see Gilbert J. Gall, Heber
Blankenhorn, the Lafollette Committee, and the Irony of Industrial Repression,
23 LAB. HIST. 246 (1982).
28. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, THE HOOVER
COMMISSION REPORT 125 (1949).
29. WILLIAM SEAL CARPENTER, THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM 78 (1952).
30. Id. at 68-69.
31. Id. at 69.
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Association called the labor practices of the federal govern-
ment "an apparent anachronism," and argued that a "gov-
ernment which imposes on other employers certain obliga-
tions in dealing with their employees may not in good faith
refuse to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably
similar favorable basis."32 It was time for government to set
the example for industry "by being perhaps more conside-
rate than the law requires of private enterprise."33 In his
1956 volume, Public Personnel Administration, 0. Glenn
Stahl argued that Congress ought to allow into the federal
service "a considerable range for collective bargaining even
of the orthodox type."34 And in 1958, Charles 0. Gregory
pointed out the irony that "the greatest 'employer' of all, so
sensitive to the needs of employees generally to organize
into unions and engage in free collective bargaining for the
maximization of their working standards, is shortsightedly
unable to perceive that its own workers might regard simi-
lar procedures as necessary to their welfare."35 By outlawing
strikes in the federal service, "Congress indulged in sheer
suppression, without any safety valve at all."36
As an early chronicler of these developments, Wilson R.
Hart, later explained, there was a growing feeling in the
1950s that the federal government's "paternalistic attitude
toward its employees" was "more fitting to a benevolent
despot than to the world's greatest democracy."37 Thus, bills
calling for federal employee collective bargaining were in-
troduced in every legislative session between 1949 and
1961.38 The most ambitious of these, sponsored by Senator
Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina and Representative
George Rhodes of Pennsylvania, would have required feder-
al agency heads to recognize unions and to negotiate policies
32. WILSON R. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 3
(1961).
33. Id.
34. 0. GLENN STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 289 (4th ed. 1956).
35. CHARLES 0. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 521 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
36. Id.
37. Wilson R. Hart, The U.S. Civil Service Learns to Live with Executive
Order 10,988: An Interim Appraisal, 17 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 203, 210 (1964).
38. SAR A. LEVITAN & ALEXANDRA B. NODEN, WORKING FOR THE SOVEREIGN:
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 13 (1983).
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related to promotions, layoffs, and grievance procedures.39
Even as support grew for the introduction of collective
bargaining in the federal service, municipal employees be-
gan to bargain collectively for the first time in New York
and Philadelphia. 0 In 1959, Wisconsin governor Gaylord
Nelson signed the first state-wide bill granting collective
bargaining to public employees.4" And finally, on January
17, 1962, President John F. Kennedy headed off legislative
efforts to enact a collective bargaining statute for the feder-
al government by issuing an executive order that granted
limited bargaining rights to federal workers. 2 Emphasizing
the growing sense that government labor relations were
adopting the private sector model, AFL-CIO president
George Meany called Kennedy's Executive Order 10,988
"the equivalent of a Wagner Act for public employees."43 In
fact, it was far from that, for Kennedy's order did not grant
one key right protected by the Wagner Act: the right to
strike. Like the 1959 Wisconsin law, or the municipal legis-
lation that Mayor Robert Wagner, Jr. signed inaugurating
collective bargaining in New York City, Kennedy's order ex-
plicitly banned strikes by the workers it covered.'
Most trade unionists were not concerned by the reitera-
tion of strike bans in the laws and executive orders that li-
beralized collective bargaining in the public sector. As the
movement to secure bargaining rights in government ga-
thered momentum, union supporters understood the need to
separate the right to bargain from the right to strike. They
tended to take one of two approaches to emphasize this se-
39. Union Recognition: Hearings on S. 3593 Before the S. Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Serv., 84th Cong. 1, 123, 263 (1956) (hearings on May 15, May
24, and June 14); Jerry Kluttz, Leader of Union Accuses Government of "Union
Busting,"WASH. POST & TIMES HERALD, May 15, 1956, at 17.
40. See MARK H. MAIER, CITY UNIONS: MANAGING DISCONTENT IN NEW YORK
CITY 44-56 (1987); Francis Ryan, Everyone Royalty: AFSCME, Municipal
Workers and Urban Power in Philadelphia, 1921-1983, ch. 4 (2003) (published
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), available at ProQuest,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=765663891&Fmt=6&clientId=39334&RQT
=309&VName=PQD.
41. SLATER, supra note 15, at 158-92.
42. Id. at 190.
43. JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, MEANY 327 (1972).
44. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962).
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paration. First, they disavowed any desire to win the right
to strike: "At no time, including the present, have they
sought to gain such a right," assured William C. Doherty,
President of the National Association of Letter Carriers in
1956.4" Government workers' unions "operate on the basis of
the principle that they do not exercise, or wish to exercise,
the right to strike," added AFL-CIO president George Mea-
ny.46 Second, they argued that the extension of bargaining
rights in government would be an effective way to prevent
strikes: "The more the spirit of democracy permeates the
employer-employee relationship in government service, the
less occasion there will be for government strikes," argued
David Ziskind, an early proponent of this tack. As collec-
tive bargaining began to spread in government in the early
1960s, skeptics had difficulty challenging either of these ar-
guments, for government workers' walkouts were few in
number. During the first half of the 1960s, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics recorded an annual average of only thirty-
three public sector strikes."
Yet a startling thing occurred in the second half of the
1960s: federal, state, and local government strikes increased
six-fold, reaching 411 in 1969, a level more than ten-times
higher than the 1959 figure. This militant trend received a
boost from the successful walkout of New York City transit
workers in defiance of the Condon-Wadlin Act in January
45. William C. Doherty, Government Workers and Organization, AM.
FEDERATIONIST, June 1956, at 9.
46. George Meany, President, AFL-CIO, Remarks at the Joint G.E.C.
Legislative Conference (May 14, 1957) (transcript available in the George
Meany Memorial Archives in AFL, AFL-CIO Dep't of Legis. (1906-1978) Legis.
Reference Files, file 50, Gov't Employees Council, AFL-CIO, 1956/01-1959/12).
47. DAVID ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 259
(Leon Stein & Philip Taft eds., Arno Press Inc. 1971) (1940). Howie McClennan,
who rose to the presidency of the International Association of Fire Fighters in
the 1960s, made a similar point. Unless workers enjoyed the full "benefits of
collective bargaining," McClennan warned, they would "be forced to take strike
action which is a symbol of the breakdown of the bargaining process." Court
Upholds Constitutionality of N.C. Law Prohibiting Agreements with Public
Employees, [Oct.-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 585, at B-5 (Dec. 16,
1974).
48. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORK STOPPAGES IN
GOVERNMENT, 1972, at 3 (1973).
49. BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2110,
WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1980, at 4 tbl. 1 (1981).
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1966. Union leader Mike Quill went to jail for calling that
strike, but his members escaped the firing penalty pre-
scribed by New York law and won a significant settlement.
President Lyndon Johnson fumed that the resulting con-
tract was "not in the national interest," but labor drew a
different lesson. The New York settlement gave municipal
workers elsewhere "something to shoot for," as Philadelphia
union leaders put it." By 1966, as one Illinois state investi-
gation found, the idea of work stoppages by public em-
ployees was no longer "as instinctively repugnant as it was
during the celebrated Boston police strike.""
The unfolding civil rights struggle of these years clearly
influenced changing views of government workers' rights to
organize and strike in at least two ways. First, it bred a new
consciousness that led government workers to cast off the
identity of "civil servant" in favor of that of the aggrieved
worker. As historian Robert Zieger aptly noted, "'[p]ublic
servants,' a phrase smacking of the old gentility, became'government workers,' more descriptive of the people who
toiled at grimy social services offices and on the city road
maintenance crews and garbage trucks."52 This was a cru-
cial part of what one contemporary analyst called a "major
change" in the "role conception" of the government worker. 3
Second, civil rights marchers' non-violent civil disobedience
encouraged public workers to themselves defy the law when
they felt justified in their struggle for justice. As another
analyst explained, "[w]hen acts of civil disobedience become
everyday occurrences, the fact that public employee strikes
are illegal" would no longer be "enough to prevent them.
5 4
These developments undermined the notion that gov-
ernment workers should not enjoy the same rights as pri-
vate sector workers. As Ken Lyons, president of the inde-
50. Impact of New York Transit Strike and Settlement Foreseen on Public
Employee Bargaining, [Jan.-Mar.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 123, at B-i,
B-3 (Jan. 17, 1966).
51. JAMES T. MOONEY, ILL. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, STRIKES BY PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES 4 (1966).
52. ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985, at
163 (1986).
53. CARY HERSHEY, PROTEST IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 1 (1973).
54. Hugh O'Neill, The Growth of Municipal Employee Unions, 30 PROC. OF
THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. 1, 13 (1970).
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pendent National Association of Government Employees
(NAGE), put it, government workers were "second-class citi-
zens who have finally grown up to demand recognition.""
Public workers increasingly compared their lot unfavorably
to workers in the private sector, rejecting the idea that they
deserved fewer rights. "The thin line of separation between
public and private employment is fast being obliterated,"
observed Al Bilik of the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 6 He insisted
that the time had come to ':fight for all trade union rights
for public employees NOW!"' By 1967, the AFL-CIO was
citing a "restless mood among government employees,"
stemming from their "inability to obtain the same gains
workers in private industry have achieved through collec-
tive bargaining. 58
In this context, the fact that they could not legally
strike became increasingly unacceptable to government
workers. "It is almost impossible to define the difference be-
tween a strike in the public service and a strike in the pri-
vate sector," added Victor Gotbaum of AFSCME, "[t]he
problems are identical in the private sector or the public
sector."59 AFSCME, the fastest growing union in the public
sector, and its fiery leader, Jerry Wurf, helped lead the
charge against strike bans. At its July 1966 executive board
meeting, the union officially reversed its past position and
demanded "the right of public employees-except for police
and other law enforcement officers-to strike."" "To fores-
tall this right," AFSCME argued, "is to handicap the free
55. Alton Ashley, Labor-Management Rift Widens Employee Discontent
Mounts, FEDNEWS, May 5, 1967, at 20, 20.
56. Al Bilik, "The Other Fourteen Percent" Public Employees as Workers and
Citizens in the U.S., in PROBLEMS CONFRONTING UNION ORGANIZATION IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 25, 33 (Eugene C. Hagburg ed., 1966).
57. Id.
58. AFL-CIO, Program to Improve Collective Bargaining in the Federal
Service 1 (Sept. 28, 1967) (program recommendation, on file with the George
Meany Memorial Archives in AFL, AFL-CIO Dep't of Legis. (1906-1978) Legis.
Reference Files, file 54, Gov't Employees Council, AFL-CIO, 1967/03-1967/09).
59. Victor Gotbaum, Collective Bargaining and the Union Leader, in PUBLIC
WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 77, 81 (Sam Zagoria ed., 1972).
60. International Executive Board, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Policy Statement on
Public Employee Unions: Rights and Responsibilities, in SORRY . . . No




Other unions followed AFSCME's lead. By 1968, even
federal sector unions began to assert the right to strike.62
The postal clerks and the National Postal Union dropped
no-strike clauses from their union constitutions that year.63
By July 1968, the Washington Post worried that "militants"
would "try to eliminate the no-strike provisions from union
constitutions next month at half a dozen national conven-
tions.""' In September, Lyons's NAGE became "the first
white-collar organization to drop its no-strike promise."65
Only after a bitter floor fight did the American Federation
of Government Employees (AFGE) overwhelmingly reject a
move to excise the long-standing no-strike clause from its
constitution.66
Beyond labor's ranks, an increasing number of liberal
voices-such as the National Council of Churches-attacked
the notion that government workers should be denied the
right to strike "solely by virtue of their public employ-
ment. ' 67 As the 1970s began, a swelling chorus of influential
voices demanded the extension of public sector strike
rights.68
In many ways, this shift in thinking was the product of
necessity. Whatever one thought about the wisdom of public
sector strikes, there was no denying the increasingly com-
mon reality of government workers' strikes or the fact that
existing strike penalties had little deterrent effect. When
61. Id.
62. MURRAY B. NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICE 374-75 (1976).
63. Id. at 375.
64. Jerry Kluttz, Militancy Developing Among Civil Servants, WASH. POST,
July 7, 1968, at A22; see also Mike Causey, Government Strike Talk Grows,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1967, at A18; Jerry Kluttz & Mike Causey, Watson Plans
Aid for Postal Workers, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1968, at All.
65. Mike Causey, NAGE Rejects No-Strike Vow, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1968,
at A22.
66. Mike Causey, Union Votes Down Move to Drop No-Strike Vow, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 1968, at A26.
67. AFL-CIO News, 3 Major Faiths Sound Themes of Racial Justice, Right to





hundreds of thousands of postal workers staged the largest
public sector walkout to that point in U.S. history in March
1970, they faced no significant penalties. Rather, they
reaped benefits-their strike helped bring about the Postal
Reform Act through which they won the right to bargain
over their compensation for the first time. Their example, in
turn, inspired government workers at local, state, and fed-
eral levels.69
As strikes spread, government unionists developed ef-
fective new arguments justifying their right to strike. Some
insisted that because government employers routinely re-
fused to negotiate with unions during an illegal strike,
strikes became unnecessarily protracted.7" Others held that
because governments were rarely in a position to follow
through on the automatic dismissal of government strikers,
the strike bans were impossible to enforce. "Law which fails
to command general respect, indeed, that is often the object
of contempt, surely is worse than no law at all," argued
AFSCME's Bilik.7' The "unrestricted right to strike" would
serve as "a more reliable deterrent to irresponsible action
than is the restrictive statute," he argued." Other union
supporters pointed out that government workers needed the
right to strike in order to "create equality at the table," a
prerequisite for labor peace. 73 The "only mechanism that
69. In the first half of the 1970s, the country averaged 377 government
workers' strikes annually-ten times the rate of a decade earlier. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 48 at 4.
70. The Council of State Governments concluded that strike bans were
ineffective and urged states to enact collective bargaining laws. See COUNCIL OF
STATE GOV'TS, STATE-LOCAL EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS (1970).
71. Al Bilik, Toward Public Sector Equality: Extending the Strike Privilege,
21 LAB. L.J. 338, 341 (1970).
72. Id. at 356. Ida Klaus, who had advised both Mayor Robert Wagner of New
York and the Kennedy administration on collective bargaining made the same
point. 'The integrity of government is threatened when government provokes
disrespect for its own processes," she observed. "It is far better to have no law
and no sanctions." Ida Klaus, Dir. of Staff Relations, N.Y. City Bd. of Educ.,
Address at the Conference on Public Employment and Collective Bargaining at
the University of Chicago's Center for Continuing Education (Mar. 12, 1966),
quoted in [Jan.-Apr.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at D-5 (Mar. 28,
1966).
73. Agreement to Limit Arbitrator's Power Cements New FAA-Machinists
Agreement, [July-Sept.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 565, at A-5, A-9 (July
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produces meaningful, good faith bargaining, and the best
deterrent to a strike, is the threat of one," explained Rose-
mary Trump of the Service Employees.74 All such arguments
shared the notion that government labor policy ought to in-
creasingly resemble private sector policy and the idea that
the more these models converged, the better public sector
labor relations would become. As AFL-CIO official Thomas
R. Donahue put it, "[t]he closer the public employee unions
can bring themselves and their styles to the private sector
model, the more productive their efforts are going to be."75
It was not only union leaders who came to believe that
public sector labor relations ought to adopt private sector
approaches.76 There was a clear shift in opinion among labor
relations professionals on this question between the mid-
1960s and the mid-1970s. When the Twentieth Century
Fund formed a task force in 1969 to recommend policies to
deal with public sector labor, the right to strike was the one
issue on which the group could reach no consensus.77 But by
the early 1970s, more professionals were beginning to agree
with the influential mediator Theodore Kheel, who cham-
pioned the notion that in the public sector, as in the private,
it was necessary to balance the weapons held by employers
and employees in order to achieve just results in collective
bargaining. "The threat to strike informs the bargaining
process with that element necessary to bring about a bar-
gain," Kheel insisted.7" Cornell professor and arbitrator
Phillip Ross agreed, predicting that government labor rela-
29, 1974) (quoting Vincent J. Paterno, President of the Association of Civilian
Technicians (ACT)).
74. Rosemary Trump, Remarks at the SEIU Public Workers Conference 94
(Nov. 13-16, 1978) (excerpts available in the Cornell University Library).
75. Thomas R. Donahue, What Do Unions Want?, in BUREAU OF NAT'L
AFFAIRS, THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE DECADE OF THE
SEVENTIES 35, 37 (Richard J. Murphy & Morris Sackman eds., 1970).
76. Charles M. Rehmus, Labor Relations in the Public Sector in the United
States, in PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF ELEVEN
NATIONS 19, 40-41 (Charles M. Rehmus ed., 1975).
77. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, PICKETS AT CITY HALL: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON LABOR
DISPUTES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 20-26 (1970).
78. Theodore W. Kheel, Summation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR RELATIONS, MAY 3-5, 1971 at 214
(1971).
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tions would soon come "close to current private sector prac-
tice" because the present model of government labor rela-
tions was "utterly inconsistent with the American tradition
of collective bargaining."79
An increasing number of judges also came to share this
view by the late 1960s. Prior to this time, the disposition of
the courts had long been uniformly hostile to the strike
rights of government workers. Courts repeatedly held that
public employee strikes were unlawful "in the absence of
specific legislative authorization";-" that public employees
had no constitutional right to strike;"' and that public em-
ployers had the right to seek injunctive relief against strikes
by their employees.82 But as the 1970s began, "thoughtful
judges" increasingly "questioned the wisdom and propriety
of permitting the absolute prohibition of the public sector
strike," according to two students of this question. 3 One of
the most influential judges to do so was J. Skelly Wright of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
whose opinion in the case generated by the 1970 postal
strike argued for the inseparability of unions and strikes. 4
79. Cornell Professor Says EO 11491 is Inherently 'Unstable" to Degree That
It Deviates from Private Sector Practice, [Apr.-June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 611, at A-2, A-3 (June 23, 1975).
80. Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 72 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2264, 2265 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1969); Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v.
Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Pinellas County, 214 So. 2d 34, 38 (Fla. 1968); City of
Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 131 A.2d 59, 62 (N.H. 1957); Port of
Seattle v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 324 P.2d 1099, 1103
(Wash. 1958).
81. City of Manchester, 131 A.2d at 61; City of New York v. De Lury, 243
N.E.2d 128, 132 (N.Y. 1968); Abbott v. Myers, 251 N.E.2d 869, 876 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1969); Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615, 621 (S.D.W. Va. 1970). Nor were
there grounds to contend that the denial of strike rights for public employees
amounted to a denial of equal protection. In re Block, 236 A.2d 589, 592 (N.J.
1967); De Lury, 243 N.E.2d at 129, 133; Rankin v. Shanker, 242 N.E.2d 802,
805-06 (N.Y. 1968).
82. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 83 A.2d 482, 484 (Conn. 1951);
City of Minot v. Gen. Drivers and Helpers Union No. 74, 142 N.W.2d 612, 617
(N.D. 1966); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance Local 930, 141
A.2d 624, 629 (R.I. 1958).
83. Kurt L. Hanslowe & John L. Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by
Government Employees, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1055, 1074 (1982).
84. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971),
affd 404 U.S. 802, 885 (1971).
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He wrote:
If the inherent purpose of a labor organization is to bring the
workers' interests to bear on management, the right to strike is,
historically and practically, an important means of effectuating
that purpose. A union that never strikes, or which can make no
credible threat to strike, may wither away in ineffectiveness.
8 5
By the mid-1970s more judges were sharing Wright's
view. In 1975, for example, the Montana Supreme Court
ruled that public workers had the right to strike.8 6 Two
years later a California court of appeals scrapped the no-
strike oaths used by many of the state's municipalities. 7 In
general, courts gave increasing credence to the notion that
government workers needed the right to strike to equalize
their bargaining power with management.
The public also seemed increasingly willing to accept
this reasoning. In 1972, mediator Arnold Zack marveled
that "[t]he public ha[d] overcome its initial blind fear of the
public employee strike, and ha[d] learned to adapt its daily
living to the illegal action." Polling confirmed this as well.
For example, a 1975 Harris poll found that a slight plurality
supported the right to strike even for firefighters and police
officers.9
It did not take long for the shift in thinking to be ex-
pressed in the political arena. Eight states granted strike
rights to public employees between 1967 and 1977.90 Con-
gress too began to re-examine the strike rights of federal
85. Id. at 885 (Wright, J., concurring).
86. Public Employees' Right to Concerted Activity Means Striking, Montana
Supreme Court Affirms, [Jan.-Mar.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 590, at B-7
(Jan. 27, 1975).
87. California Courts Void Mandatory No-Strike Oath, [July-Sept.] Gov't
Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 722, at 15 (Aug. 22, 1977).
88. Arnold M. Zack, Impasses Strikes, and Resolutions, in PUBLIC WORKERS
AND PUBLIC UNIONS, supra note 59, at 101, 103.
89. Public Opinion Seen Swinging Against Government Employee Unions;
Productivity Advances Protected, [Oct. 6-Dec. 29] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No. 626, at Z-1, Z-2 (Oct. 6, 1975).
90. B.V.H. Schneider, Public Sector Labor Legislation-An Evolutionary
Analysis, in PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION SERIES 191, 203 & n.32 (Benjamin Aaron, Joseph R. Grodin &
James L. Stern eds., 1979).
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workers. A first step in this direction came when the House
Post Office and Civil Service Committee (HPOCS) reported
out a bill in 1973 that would have granted postal workers
the right to strike. As Representative Charles H. Wilson (D-
CA) explained, the bill was necessary to give the unions "an'equal hand' in bargaining with management."9 The chair-
man of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee,
Gale McGee (D-WY), meanwhile, called for a law that would"place labor-management relations in the federal sector on a
statutory foundation similar to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act in the private sector."92
As references to an "equal hand" or a federal policy
"similar" to that of the private sector suggest, the legitimi-
zation of public sector strikes in the late 1960s and early
1970s emerged from the idea that both the cause of justice
and efficient labor relations would be well served by balanc-
ing workers' powers against those of their employers. The
assumption that labor law ought to balance weapons-the
very assumption that lay at the heart of the Supreme
Court's 1938 Mackay doctrine 93-thus provided liberating
leverage to public sector workers and their unions who
sought the right to strike in this period. Some officials of the
Nixon administration even accepted this view. William
Usery, who served as undersecretary of Labor and director
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
under Nixon, as well as Secretary of Labor under Gerald R.
Ford, was a proponent of the weapons-balancing argument.
Usery explained that as a "general rule" he favored strike
rights for federal workers. Unless federal workers won the
right to strike, he worried, federal employees would soon be
"isolated from the rest of the nation's workforce as the only
group denied the legal right to strike."94 This outcome, in his
91. House POCS Subcommittee Reports Out Right to Strike Legislation for
Postal Workers, [Oct.-Dec.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 525, at A-8 (Oct. 15,
1973).
92. Labor Relations Act for Federal Employees Again Urged by Unions, [Apr.-
June] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 506, at A-7 (June 4, 1973).
93. NLRB. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
94. Usery Creates Stir With Claim that Federal Employees are ' Becoming
Isolated" Without Full Bargaining Rights, [July-Sept.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 564, at A-4 (July 22, 1974).
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view, "would not be acceptable."95
II. TURNABOUT YEARS: PROBLEMATIZING THE (PUBLIC
SECTOR) STRIKE, 1975-1981
By the mid-1970s, government workers had gone far
toward legitimizing public sector strikes by arguing that the
private sector labor relations model ought to be imported
into government. By January 1976, 37 states had enacted
collective bargaining statutes covering some or all public
sector workers in their states.96 In two other states, attorney
general opinions authorized collective bargaining; in Illinois
a governor's executive order did the same, and in New Mex-
ico a state personnel board instituted it.97 That left just nine
states without any collective bargaining policy in place.9"
Moreover, jurisdictions from New York to California were
considering the liberalization of strike rights in government
employment.99
Government unionists had good reason to believe that
they would complete the process of importing the private
sector labor relations model into the public sector. Signify-
ing this hope was the National Public Employee Relations
Act (NPERA), a bill promoted by AFSCME and other public
sector unions, which amounted to "a Wagner Act for public
95. Id. Under pressure from conservative Republicans who demanded his
resignation, Usery would later backtrack from this view. Usery Nomination Sent
to Senate Floor, [Dec. 30-Apr. 4] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 642, at A-5
(Feb. 2, 1976).
96. Joan Weitzman, Current Trends in Public Sector Labor Relations
Legislation, 5 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 233, 233 (1976).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. In January 1975, New York state legislators began considering changes
to the New York City charter in order to legalize municipal strikes, while in
California a legislative commission cited "the futility of strike prohibitions" and
recommended relaxation of such bans. See N.Y. State Charter Revision
Commission Urged to Reform New York City Municipal Labor Relations, [Jan.-
Mar.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 594, at B-3 (Feb. 24, 1975) (discussing
New York); BENJAMIN AARON ET AL., REPORT AND PROPOSED STATUTE OF THE
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, 232
(Mar. 15, 1973).
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employees."'' 0 Sponsored by Representative William Clay
(D-MO), a former AFSCME organizer, the bill would have
superseded state labor laws and created a national board
analogous to the NLRB to protect the right to organize for
all state and local government workers. "We decided that it
made much more sense to seek relief through a federal law,"
explained AFSCME president Jerry Wurf, rather "than to
dribble out our lives trying to convince 50 state legislatures,
5,000 city councils, and 10,000 school boards and who
knows how many other public bodies to devise an impartial
mechanism at the lower level."'0 1 The Clay bill also prom-
ised to extend the right to strike to government workers not
responsible for protecting public safety. While it was an
ambitious measure, its passage seemed feasible in early
1975 due to a fortuitous conjunction of circumstances: Dem-
ocrats racked up large majorities in the House and Senate
in the Watergate-influenced congressional elections of 1974;
the Senate lowered the cloture threshold necessary to end
filibusters to three fifths (it had previously been two-thirds);
and in the cases of Maryland v. Wirtz and Fry v. United
States, the Supreme Court had seemingly recognized the
power of federal law to override state and local law in the
area of government labor relations policies.0 2 For these rea-
sons, not just AFSCME lobbyists, but many impartial ob-
servers felt that the passage of the Clay bill or something
like it was very likely in 1975."3
Not only did the Clay bill fail in the end, it never came
to a vote. The historic conjuncture that had seen public sec-
tor workers dramatically expand their movement, lay claim
to elements of private sector labor relations, and legitimize
100. For an extended account of the struggle to pass this bill, see Joseph A.
McCartin, "A Wagner Act for Public Employees" Labor's Deferred Dream and
the Rise of Conservatism, 1970-1976, J. AM. HIST. 123 (2008).
101. RALPH J. FLYNN, PUBLIC WORK, PUBLIC WORKERS 83 (1975).
102. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (holding that state and local
governments could be compelled to abide by federal wage ceilings); Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding that municipal hospitals could be subject to
the Fair Labor Standards Act).
103. Stephen L. Hayford & Peter A. Veglahn, A Questionable Public Sector
Bargaining Strategy-Anxiety Arousal, 4 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 238, 238
(1975); A Many-Sided Squeeze, TIME, Dec. 16, 1974, at 31 (stating that Ralph
Flynn, executive director of the Coalition of American Public Employees,
predicted "certain passage" of the NPERA).
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their demand for the right to strike began to collapse in
1975. Over the next six years, the tide turned sharply
against government unions. In many ways, the unions held
their own against this shifting tide, even expanding their
membership despite growing opposition. However, unions
lost the initiative in shaping labor policy during these years
and they saw politicians, labor relations professionals, and
the public alike reject the notion that government workers
deserved the right to strike.
There were at least four reasons for this sudden turna-
bout. First, a fiscal crisis that affected New York City and
other local and state governments made politicians at all
levels more resistant to the demands of public employees."
Second, the surprising new phenomenon of "stagflation" had
the perverse effect of simultaneously ballooning government
deficits, goading government workers into increasingly un-
popular strikes for wage increases to offset raging inflation,
and recruiting a generation of worried suburbanites into a
"tax revolt" that demonized "big government" (and thus
government unions)."5 Third, conservatives began to organ-
ize in groups such as the Public Service Research Council
(PSRC) and the Americans Against Union Control of Gov-
ernment (AAUCG), developing powerful arguments against
collective bargaining in the public sector by drawing a con-
nection between the growth of bargaining and the growth of
strikes."6 Finally, the relative stability of the post-war pri-
vate sector labor relations model, which had once inspired
public sector workers, broke down under the combined
forces of de-industrialization, deregulation, and a new era of
globalization."7
The breakdown of stability in private sector labor rela-
tions was sudden. Although union density in the private
sector had inched steadily downward after 1955, it was only
after 1973 that private sector unions began to sense the
true dimensions of their growing troubles. Successive ener-
gy crises and a fluctuating dollar crippled manufacturing
industries, and the share of U.S. jobs generated by that sec-
tor fell from around twenty seven percent in 1970 to seven-
104. See McCartin, supra note 100, at 136-44.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. (discussing these developments more fully).
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teen percent in 1990.18 Unions won a majority of union rec-
ognition elections conducted by the NLRB in every year be-
tween 1936 and 1974.09 But between 1974 and 1998, unions
lost a majority of NLRB elections every year."0 Not surpri-
singly, the average annual strike rate began to trend down
after 1974, dropping by twenty-seven percent in the second
half of the 1970s.' The deregulation of the airline and
trucking industries further weakened entrenched unions.
Furthermore, employers became increasingly aggressive in
both resisting union formation and trying to break strikes."2
Labor historians have repeatedly told the story of pri-
vate sector union declension in this period in ways that dis-
connected it from what was happening simultaneously in
the public sector. Most narratives of labors' woes in the
1970s point to the failure of the Congress to override a Se-
nate filibuster in 1978 to enact labor law reform."3 Yet these
accounts have not connected that defeat to the failure of
William Clay's NPERA bill more than two years earlier. In
fact, the resistance to public sector union power that snuffed
out hopes for the passage of the Clay bill also helped deter-
mined the political landscape on which private sector labor
law reform foundered in 1978.
The Clay bill died largely because of rising opposition to
108. See PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY 263 (1994).
109. See 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, PART B: WORK AND
WELFARE 2-352 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006)
110. See id.
111. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 26 (reporting an average of
334 strikes per year between 1970-1974 and an average of 244 strikes per year
between 1975-1979).
112. On the rise of employer resistance in these years, see ROBERT MICHAEL
SMITH, FROM BLACKJACKS TO BRIEFCASES: A HISTORY OF COMMERCIALIZED
STRIKEBREAKING AND UNIONBUSTING IN THE UNITED STATES (2003), and John
Logan, The Union Avoidance Industry in the United States, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS.
REL. 651 (2006). On the rise of strikebreaking by employers after 1974, see
Michael H. LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker
Replacements: Empirical Analysis of NLRA and RLS Strikes, 1935-1991, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169 (1995).
113. For one such account, see Gary M. Fink, Fragile Alliance: Jimmy Carter
and the American Labor Movement, in THE PRESIDENCY AND DOMESTIC POLICIES




public sector strikes after the summer of 1975.14 Support for
public sector workers' strikes sank even among private sec-
tor union allies, who were increasingly worried about plant
closings, facing give-backs at the bargaining table, and in-
flation and their own tax bills.'15
Democratic political leaders, once allied with labor,
grasped this shifting sentiment as they struggled to recon-
cile growing budget deficits on one hand with insistent un-
ion leaders who sought increased wages and benefits for
their inflation-pressed members on the other. Democrats in
many cases even began to take the lead in blaming public
sector strikes for their budget problems. During a series of
prominent labor conflicts in Pennsylvania, New York City,
Seattle, and San Francisco in 1975, Democratic officials at-
tacked public sector strikers for holding taxpayers hostage
with unreasonable demands during a time of fiscal austeri-
ty. 6 Politicians who "stood up to" union demands saw their
popularity rise. "Pollster Louis Harris, measuring public
opinion trends, [began] advising politicians to run against
the unions."'117 All of this pleased labor reporter A.H. Raskin,
who wrote: "[c]itizen revulsion-that healthiest of correc-
tives in a democracy-is signaling an imminent end to fur-
ther retreat by civic authorities into appeasement [of la-
bor] W8
Diminishing support for public sector strikes under-
mined legal assumptions on which Clay's NPERA bill had
114. For example, Harris polls showed a ten-point drop in public support for
teacher strikes between 1974 and 1978. Harris Poll: Public Opposes Strikes by
Teachers, Police, Firefighters, [July 3-Dec.18] Govt Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No.790, at 25-26 (Dec. 18, 1978).
115. See Nicholas von Hoffman, The Last Days of the Labor Movement,
HARPER'S, Dec. 1978, at 22 (arguing that during the recession of the mid-1970s,
public opinion had "turned so ferociously against striking civil servants that
nongovernmental union members [would not] even support them").
116. On the Pennsylvania, Seattle, and New York conflicts, see McCartin,
supra note 100, at 137-40. On the San Francisco conflict, see RANDOLPH H.
BOEHM & DAN C. HELDMAN, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, AND THE EROSION OF
CIvic TRUST 211-36 (1982).
117. Joan Weitzman, Current Trends in Public Sector Labor Relations
Legislation, 5 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 233, 245 (1976).
118. A.H. Raskin, Conclusion: The Current Political Contest, in PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE UNIONS: A STUDY OF THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS
203, 204 (A. Lawrence Chickering ed., 1976).
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been drafted. The legislation had been framed on the belief
that the Wirtz and Fry cases had clearly established the ba-
sis for federal legislation that would set the framework for
state and local labor policies."9 This belief proved un-
founded. The Supreme Court had a chance to revise its
stance on whether the federal government had the right to
regulate state and local government labor relations in the
case of National League of Cities v. Usery.12° This case con-
cerned whether Congress had exceeded its powers when it
extended the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to cover state and local government workers
in 1974.12 Most labor observers believed that the court
would uphold the Fair Labor Standards Act extension, con-
firm Congress's regulatory power, and thus solidify the
foundation upon which the NPERA would rest.'22 "And then
a funny thing happened on the way to the Capitol," as legal
analyst Theodore Sachs put it.'23
The court heard oral argument in the case on March 2,
1976, in the wake of the controversy over public sector
strikes had been growing over the previous nine months.
Democratic governor of Utah, Calvin L. Rampton argued
the case for the appellants. He lost no time in reminding the
court of the stakes. If it approved the FLSA extension the
court would open the door to far reaching legislation, he ob-
served. "Right now there is pending before the Congress
bills that would extend all provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act to states, including ... giving employees the
right to strike," Rampton observed, and those bills were be-
ing held up "only because of the pendency of this case."'24 If
the court let the FLSA extension stand, then it would open
the legislative floodgates, after which the anxious governor
119. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968).
120. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
121. Id.
122. See generally Neal R. Pierce, Major Impact Expected From Decision on
Labor Act, NAT'L J., May 17, 1975, at 740-45.
123. Theodore Sachs, Federal Regulation of the Public Sector: Implications of
National League of Cities v. Usery, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 12 (Andria S. Knapp ed., 1977).
124. Audio file: Oral Reargument, Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, Docket No.




could foresee "no logical stopping point."'25 The argument
was apparently convincing. By a 5-4 vote the Court over-
turned the FLSA extension, with the majority premising its
opinion on the notion that federal regulation of state and
local labor relations violated the Tenth Amendment.'26 The
notes of Justice Harry Blackmun who concurred with the
majority indicate that the fiscal crisis and public sector la-
bor upheaval weighed on the Justices' minds.'27 The implica-
tions of the decision were immediately clear: the move to
enact a national Wagner Act for public workers was dead.'
Because Clay's NPERA stood athwart the court's new think-
ing, it was consigned to the legislative dustbin.19
Despite this setback, public strikes did not abate in the
second half of the 1970s. To the contrary, they grew more
frequent as government workers turned to their most effec-
tive weapon to try to force their increasingly resistant em-
ployers not to balance government budgets on the backs of
underpaid sanitation workers, teachers, and other public
employees. 3 ° The results were predictably combustible,
leading several long-time Democratic allies to confront pub-
lic sector strikers head-on. In a series of sanitation strikes
in 1977 and 1978, in Atlanta, Detroit, San Antonio, and
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, Democratic mayors-including liber-
als Maynard Jackson in Atlanta and Coleman Young in De-
troit-broke strikes by either firing and replacing strikers
or threatening to do so.' In these cases tough-talking mu-
125. FLSA Extension to State and Local Employees Regargued Before the
United States, [Dec. 30-Apr.4] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 647, at B-7 to -
13 (Mar. 8, 1976); Audio file: National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), U.S. Supreme Court Oral Reargument, at 13:00 (Mar. 2, 1976),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1974/1974_74_878/reargument/.
126. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
127. See McCartin, supra note 100 at 144-45.
128. Id. at 146.
129. For a fuller discussion, see id., at 144-48.
130. During the first half of the 1970s, there was an annual average of 377
public sector strikes, while during the second half of the decade, the annual
average jumped by approximately twenty five percent to 469 per year. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 4.
131. For a full account of these episodes and their impact, see Joseph A.
McCartin, "Fire the Hell Out of Them" Sanitation Workers' Struggles and the
Normalization of the Striker Replacement Strategy in the 1970s, 2 LAB. STUD.
WORKING-CLASS HIST. AM. 67 (2005).
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nicipal officials saw their poll numbers rise.132 Other muni-
cipalities followed suit. When seventy fire fighters walked
off the job in Vernon, California, on August 23, 1978, pro-
testing a cost-cutting plan adopted in response to the pas-
sage of Proposition 13, the city immediately hired replace-
ment fire fighters and changed the locks on the fire station
doors.'33 As James Farmer, leader of the Coalition of Ameri-
can Public Employees (CAPE), explained: "The current so-
called tax revolt encouraged cities to take a hard line with
their public employees. Many people feel that they have
public workers over a barrel."'
In cases when governments tried to compromise with
striking workers, they often faced a backlash from voters, as
happened in Memphis in 1978. After making contract con-
cessions in 1977 in deference to a city budget crisis, only to
find out that the crisis had been overstated, Memphis fire
fighters and police officers staged a series of escalating work
stoppages in the summer of 1978, with sanitation workers
honoring their picket lines. When Mayor Wyeth Chandler
concluded an agreement with the strikers that raised their
wages, tax payers grew furious. In response to the public
outcry, the city council authorized an amendment to the
Memphis charter stating that in the future any municipal
employee who participated in a strike would "be conclusive-
ly deemed to have resigned his appointment or employment
with the City," and barred municipal officials from negotiat-
ing an amnesty for strikers. Voters passed the measure
handily.'35
During this same summer of 1978, with a backlash
against public sector unions well underway, the effort to
pass private sector labor law reform fell two votes short of
shutting down a filibuster in the Senate--with Senator
132. See id.
133. Striking Fire Fighters Fired in Vernon, Cal., [July 3-Dec. 18] Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 778, at 18-19 (Sept. 25, 1978).
134. Rick Atkinson, Public Workers Meeting Stiffer Resistance in Walkouts,
KAN. CITY TIMES, Mar. 18, 1980, at Al, A6.
135. Herbert R. Northrup & J. Daniel Morgan, The Memphis Police and
Firefighters Strikes of 1978: A Case Study, in EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND




Howard Baker of Tennessee helping to kill the bill.'36 The
public sector strikes that had sowed divisions between
Democrats and unions made it easier for three Democratic
senators, whose votes labor had once counted on, to support
the filibuster.'37
Public sector strikes continued even though public opi-
nion toward them was changing, causing many union lead-
ers to worry that they would soon suffer a backlash. "I urge
you to think twice before calling any strike," Lester Asher,
general counsel for the Service Employees International
Union told a public workers conference in November
1978. '38 But few government workers facing inflation and
stagnating pay were in a mood to accept Asher's advice. In
1979 an all-time record 593 government strikes involved a
quarter of a million government workers and resulted in
nearly three million idle workdays.'39 In the first six months
of 1980, the strike rate broke another record.'40 A vicious
cycle had emerged in which fiscally pressed governments
resisted union demands, leading government workers to
launch unpopular strikes, which in turn led politicians into
more confrontations with unions.
There were no longer as many voices urging a liberali-
zation of anti-strike laws as there had been in the early
1970s. Now the trend went in the other direction. Promi-
nent educator Myron Lieberman, who started out cham-
pioning collective bargaining for teachers in the 1950s,
turned against it by the end of the 1970s, disenchanted by
136. See TAYLOR E. DARK, THE UNIONS AND THE DEMOCRATS: AN ENDURING
ALLIANCE 108-11 (1999); Senate Again Fails to Curb Filibuster on Labor
Measure, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1978, at D14.
137. The Democrats who voted to sustain the filibuster were Dale Bumpers
(Arkansas), Edward Zorinsky (Nebraska), and John Sparkman (Alabama). Even
some of those who remained loyal felt the strain: Senator Jim Sasser of
Tennessee voted with labor in this showdown "at considerable political cost to
himself' according to Congressional Quarterly. See Harrison H. Donnelly,
Organized Labor Found 1978 a Frustrating Year, Had Few Victories in
Congress, CONG. Q., Dec. 30, 1978, at 3539, 3540.
138. Lester Asher, Remarks at the SEIU Public Workers Conference 9, 11
(Nov. 13-16, 1978) (excerpts available in the Cornell University Library).
139. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 48, at
4.
140. See id.; Public Sector Strikes on the Increase, GOV'T UNION CRITIQUE (Pub.
Serv. Res. Council), Sept. 26, 1980, at 4.
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teachers' strikes. 4' Five states enacted tougher penalties
against government strikers between 1978 and 1981.142 And
in 1980, Governor William Milliken of Michigan vetoed leg-
islation that would have granted limited strike rights to
400,000 teachers, hospital, sanitation, and other municipal
employees.'43 The strike, seen as an inevitable feature of
public sector labor relations at the beginning of the decade,
had become increasingly controversial.
III. LESSONS OF THE PUBLIC MODEL: ERODING STRIKE
POWER ACROSS SECTORS, 1981-2005
On March 20, 1980, the nation's leading anti-public sec-
tor union organization, the Public Service Research Council
(PSRC) held a symposium in Vienna, Virginia, attended by
thirty civic leaders and educators. Its members were opti-
mistic. "Public opinion will play a decisive role in the
1980's," Myron Lieberman predicted to the gathering, "and
it seems to me public opinion will turn increasingly against
public sector bargaining."'" Although opinion did appear to
be shifting in the ways Lieberman indicated, the PSRC still
felt that it lacked a true champion for its cause. Too many
politicians engaged in ritualistic battles with illegal gov-
ernment strikers only to welcome them back to work after
the strikes were over. "Each time public servants strike in
violation of court orders, laws or contractual agreements,
officials warn that the strikers will be punished, usually by
fines or firings or both," only to later offer strikers amnesty
as part of the deal ending the walkout, observed Washing-
141. See Union Advocate Changes Mind, GOV'T UNION CRITIQUE (Pub. Serv.
Res. Council), Feb. 16, 1979, at 4. Compare MYRON LIEBERMAN, EDUCATION AS A
PROFESSION 334-72 (1956), with MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING:
A POLICY REAPPRAISAL (1980).
142. Compare HELENE S. TANIMOTO & JOYCE M. NAJITA, GUIDE TO STATUTORY
PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: STRIKE RIGHTS AND
PROHIBITIONS 14 (2d ed. 1978), with HELENE S. TANIMOTO & JOYCE M. NAJITA,
GUIDE TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
STRIKE RIGHTS AND PROHIBITIONS 17 (3d ed. 1981).
143. Right to Strike for Michigan Public Workers Vetoed in Near Miss by
Governor, [July-Sept.] Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 873, at 24 (Aug. 4, 1980).
144. Scholars See Public Sector Unionism Decline, GOV'T UNION CRITIQUE (Pub.
Serv. Res. Council), Mar. 28, 1980, at 1.
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ton Post columnist Bill Gold in 1979.' 45 This only encouraged
more walkouts, Gold argued, for "each time amnesty is
granted and illegal acts go unpunished" it became "more
likely that other illegal acts will follow."'46 Who could break
the cycle?
The PSRC found the champion it was seeking in Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan. Reagan was an unlikely champion in
many ways. He was a lifetime member of the Screen Actors
Guild, AFL-CIO, the only U.S. President to have led a un-
ion. Moreover, as governor of California he had been the
kind of politician about whom Gold complained. In May
1972, California faced its first reported strike by state em-
ployees when workers on a state water project walked off
their job for five days. "' Although the walkout was illegal,
state officials imposed no sanctions on the strikers. Instead,
with Reagan's blessing the workers were offered a 12.5 per-
cent raise.'48 The PSRC's national director, David Denholm,
had worked for the California Right to Work Committee in
the early 1970s, and the experience had led him to distrust
Reagan. It seemed to Denholm that as governor Reagan
took pains to avoid confronting unions. ' But the Ronald
Reagan who won the presidency at the head of the conserv-
ative movement in 1980 was not the same man who go-
verned California in the early 1970s. Reagan had seen the
political winds shift against public sector strikes in the mid-
1970s, and he had shifted with them.
When nearly 12,000 air traffic controllers employed by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) walked off their
jobs on August 3, 1981, dissatisfied with a contract offer
that fell far short of their demands, Reagan issued a stern
warning: if these striking members of the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) did not return to
work within 48 hours they would be terminated and perma-
nently replaced. The highly trained PATCO strikers, who
included a large majority of entire controller workforce,
145. Bill Gold, The District Line, WASH. POST, March 20, 1979, at B14.
146. Id.
147. WINSTON W. CROUCH, ORGANIZED CIVIL SERVANTS: PUBLIC EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN CALIFORNIA 41, 236 (1978).
148. See id. at 41; California Strike Ends, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1972, at 12.
149. Interview with David Y. Denholm, Nat'l Dir. of PSRC, in Vienna, Va.
(Jan. 28, 2004) (audiotape on file with author).
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were incredulous. "I never dreamed that they could elimi-
nate three quarters of the workforce and keep the system
working," explained Indianapolis PATCO striker Terry Bo-
bell. '5 But this is exactly what Reagan did.
That Reagan took a strong stance against the strike was
not surprising. The strikers had expected the government to
assume an aggressive posture. But they also expected that
as the strike unfolded the dangers of running a short-staffed
system, the costs of cutting back half the nation's scheduled
flights, and of training an entire generation of new control-
lers would force the government to come to terms. The
strikers were not far off in their assessment of the strike's
impact. By the White House's own accounting, Trans World
Airlines lost $10 million on the first day of the walkout
alone. 5' Yet despite the terrible costs of resisting the union's
demands, the administration did not come to terms. Not on-
ly did the administration fire the strikers after the 48-hour
deadline, it refused to hire back any strikers, even after the
union had been decertified and despite the fact that leading
Republicans privately asked the president to show mercy to
the fired controllers.' 2
The impact of Reagan's action was stunning. The
PATCO strike had been unlike any other in U.S. history,
unfolding in every state and territory from Maine to Guam.
It provided the largest and most public stage imaginable
upon which to enact a strike-breaking drama. The symbolic
importance of the event is hard to exaggerate. As historian
William C. Berman argued, the strike "served notice to the
country that a new day in government-labor-management
relations had dawned."'
53
The greatest impact of the PATCO strike was not in its
broad symbolism, however, but rather in its direct influence
150. Telephone interview with Terry Bobell, PATCO striker (Aug. 5, 2003)
(audiotape on file with author).
151. Late PATCO Developments (11:30 a.m. Tuesday), n.d. [Aug. 4, 1981], OA
10520, David Gergen Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley,
Cal.
152. On Kemp's involvement, see Interview by Leo Perlis with Arthur
Shostak, Emeritus Professor, Drexel University, Phila. (May 1985) (on file with
the Arthur B. Shostak Collection, University of Texas at Arlington).




on employer behavior in both the public and private sectors.
In the first weeks after the strike, one government trade
unionist feared that the strike would inspire imitation by
other government employers.'54 "[N]ow we will have thou-
sands of little Ronald Reagans across the country in every
town saying, 'Fire them,' whenever public employees con-
front them in a labor dispute," he predicted. 5 Judging by
the letters Reagan received from mayors around the coun-
try, such worries were not ill-founded. One wrote:
I have experienced on a smaller scale the difficulties associated
with taking such a firm position on very delicate matters such as
this, and want you to know that as a citizen of the United States, I
am very satisfied with your action to terminate those who have de-
cided to disregard an order from the highest authority in the land,
the court. Too often in the past we have 'negotiated' away what is
right, because it was easier.
56
Reagan's firing of the air traffic controllers would "make the
work of municipal administrators easier in dealing with the
public sector labor groups," added the mayor of Garland,
Texas. 5 "By his unshakable firmness, Reagan sent a mes-
sage to public employees unions that cannot possibly be mi-
sunderstood," crowed the columnist James J. Kilpatrick.'58
"The president's example will strengthen the hand of local
governments everywhere," he prophesied.'59
Kilpatrick was correct in predicting that public sector
employers would feel empowered by Reagan's example. For
instance, in the fall of 1981, Ohio teachers reported the
most severe wave of contract take-back demands since col-
lective bargaining first came to Ohio schools. 60 In the face of
such aggression and cowed by Reagan's example, public un-
154. Air Controllers' Strike, 41 FACTS ON FILE YEARBOOK 1981, at 772 (1982).
155. Id.
156. Letter from William Oakley, Mayor, City of Romulus, Mich., to Ronald
Reagan (Aug. 14, 1981) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
157. Letter from Charles G. Glack, Mayor, City of Garland, Tex., to Ronald
Reagan (Aug. 21, 1981) (on file with the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library).
158. James J. Kilpatrick, Lesson of the PATCO Strike is Sinking In, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1981, at B18.
159. Id.
160. Elizabeth Sullivan, Public Unions Reach Flash Point, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 7, 1981, at 7-B.
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ions became more timid. According to careful estimates by
David Lewin, the number of government workers' strikes
dropped by forty percent between 1980 and 1982; the num-
ber of work days lost due to strikes dropped by fifty percent
over the same period. 6 ' In New York State, the apparent
impact of the PATCO strike was even more dramatic. Dur-
ing the seven years leading up to 1981, New York averaged
twenty public sector strikes per year; in the seven years fol-
lowing the PATCO strike the average plummeted by ninety
percent to a rate of two strikes per year.'62 In the seven
years before PATCO, an average of 24,442 public workers
struck each year in New York State; during the same period
after PATCO the average was 35263 According to Ben
Rathbun of the Bureau of National Affairs, the PATCO
strike simply had a "devastating impact on employee rela-
tions in the federal, state and local sectors."" Not only did
militancy subside, but so too did the growth momentum
that had characterized the public sector movement in the
1960s and 1970s. In one measure of this slowing momen-
tum, the unionization rate of teachers dropped by almost
four percent between 1980 and 1982.165
The rapid decline in public sector strikes in turn pre-
saged a similar turnabout in the private sector. Private sec-
tor labor relations were particularly precarious in the early
1980s. By many measures, the early 1980s were wrenching:
the decade began with inflation topping thirteen percent
and unemployment exceeding seven percent. An effort by
the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States to rein in
inflation worsened matters for working-class families. The
Fed's shock therapy sent unemployment to nearly ten per-
cent by 1982. During 1981-83, 12.3 percent of the U.S. work-
force experienced at least one involuntary job loss. Although
161. Lewin was forced to estimate because the Reagan administration
suspended the collection of data on public sector strikes in 1981. David Lewin,
Public Employee Unionism in the 1980s: An Analysis of Transformation, in
UNIONS IN TRANSITION: ENTERING THE SECOND CENTURY 247 (Seymour Martin
Lipset ed., 1986).
162. RONALD DONOVAN, ADMINISTERING THE TAYLOR LAW: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS IN NEW YORK 205-06 (1990).
163. Id.
164. Unions Warned of PATCO Effect, GOV'T UNION CRITIQUE (Pub. Serv. Res.
Council), Nov. 6, 1981, at 5.
165. Lewin, supra note 161, at 245.
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the economic slowdown did throttle inflation, it came at a
cost. It was not until 1987 that unemployment finally re-
ceded below seven percent.'66 During these years of insecuri-
ty private sector workers saw employers take the offensive.
Emboldened by the PATCO strike and the rollback in public
sector strike activity, private sector employers began to ex-
ploit the latent power of the Mackay doctrine that had lain
largely dormant for decades.
During the 1960s, public sector unionists had effectively
used the "weapons balancing" argument to advance their
campaign to legitimize government workers' strikes. By the
1980s, the law and its underlying assumptions had not
changed, but the context within which they operated had
begun to change radically.'67 When conditions no longer fa-
vored strikes in the public or private sector, the "weapons
balancing" assumption on which the law rested took on an
ominous new meaning.
In their 1973 treatise, Labor Unions: How To: Avert
Them, Beat Them, Out-Negotiate Them, Live With Them,
Unload Them, I. Herbert Rothenberg and Steven B. Silver-
man argued that "the very keystone of the labor movement.
• . is found in the mandate 'Don't cross the picket liner It is
compliance with this elementary and primitive command
which holds the entire labor movement together," they ex-
plained.'68 "If unions could not induce or compel enough of
their members not to cross picket-lines, then the whole of
the labor movement would instantly become as ineffectual
and sterile as would its picket-lines."'69 Ten years after Ro-
thenberg and Silverman conceived of a strike-less labor
166. WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL RESERVE
RUNS THE COUNTRY chs. 2-4 (1987); LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & JOHN
SCHMITT, ECON. POL'Y INST., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, 2000-2001, at 237,
238 & tbl.3.10 (2001).
167. This is not to say that the law remained static. For treatments of the
changes that did occur, see generally JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, "IF THE
WORKERS TOOK A NOTION": THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT ( 2005); James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right
to Strike, and Other Tales, (Rutgers Law Sch. (Newark) Faculty Papers, Paper
No. 3, 2004), available at http://1aw.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art3/.
168. I. HERBERT ROTHENBERG & STEVEN B. SILVERMAN, LABOR UNIONS: How To:





movement, their dream began to materialize. Charles R.
Perry, Andrew M. Kramer, and Thomas J. Schneider of the
Wharton School were among those who saw to that. Months
after the PATCO strike, they published Operating During
Strikes: Company Experience, NLRB Policies, and Govern-
ment Regulations, encouraging employers to seize the right
to replace strikers that the Supreme Court had granted
them in 1938.170 Up to that point, they noted, this right was
not "widely exercised by management" because it was "not
institutionally popular."'' But Reagan had helped change
that, they believed. "The dramatic handling of the flight
controllers' strike . . . called attention to a relatively new
phenomenon in United States industrial relations-the de-
termination of management to operate facilities when em-
ployees strike."'72 The hopes of the Wharton School re-
searchers were soon borne out.
In the years between 1950 and 1980, there was roughly
one documented case of employers attempting to perma-
nently replace strikers per every seventy-six major work
stoppages. In the decade after the PATCO strike, the use of
replacement workers became ten times more common: once
per seven major work stoppages.173 Employers willingness to
replace strikers, combined with economic insecurity and the
170. See generally CHARLES R. PERRY, ANDREW M. KRAMER & THOMAS J.
SCHNEIDER, OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES,
AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 1 (1982).
171. Id. at 1.
172. Id. at iii.
173. These ratios were calculated using figures on major work stoppages
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and figures on cases involving
replacement workers heard before the NLRB or the Railway Labor Board as
discovered by Michael LeRoy. For relevant data, see BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 49, at tbl.1, and LeRoy, supra note
6, at 198-207. A calculation by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) came
up with a slightly different ratio: one use of replacements per nine major strikes
in 1985. The GAO study is discussed in Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, The Use
of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The U.S. Experience,
1980-1989, 16 J. OF LAB. ECON. 667, 672 (1998). Yet a study by Cynthia Gramm
of strikes in New York and across the nation cited a ratio of approximately one
use of replacements for every five strikes across the nation. Cynthia Gramm,
Employers' Decisions to Operate During Strikes: Consequences and Policy
Implications, in ECON. POLY INST., EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY:




increased hostility of the Reagan-era NLRB, frightened
workers and unions and sent the strike rate tumbling after
1981.174 After 1980, the pattern of strike activity began to
diverge from the business cycle for the first time since
World War II. 175 During the 1960s and 1970s, the rate of
major work stoppages in the United States rose slightly,
from 283 per year in the first decade to 289 per year in the
second. Yet during the 1980s, the bottom fell out of the ma-
jor work stoppage rate as it dipped to eighty-three per year.
During the 1990s, it fell further to thirty-four, and in the
first five years of the twentieth century it was a mere twen-
ty-four per year. In 2002, the nation reached an astonishing
point: only nineteen major work stoppages took place that
year, involving only 46,000 workers--only 1/60th of the
number of workers who had been involved in major work
stoppages fifty years earlier in 1952.
Efforts to restore whatever balance had once existed in
laws governing strikes came to naught. "[A]t least nine sep-
arate congressional hearings [were] devoted to the issue be-
tween 1988 and 1995."1" Those hearings eventually pro-
duced a viable bill that would restrict employers' ability to
replace strikers. The bill reached the floor of Congress dur-
ing President Bill Clinton's first term only to be derailed by
a Senate filibuster. After that, organized labor seemingly
gave up its effort to recapture the power to strike, apparent-
ly judging it to be a futile cause.'77
174. For example, the Reagan era NLRB further weakened workers' ability to
strike effectively by withdrawing what had once been "statutorily protected
strike and picket line conduct." JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE
SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947-1994, at 263 (1995). Past
boards had consistently held that verbal abuse of strike-breakers by picketers
was permissible if non-violent. Id. The Reagan board took a different view in the
Clear Pine Mouldings case, "finding oral threats alone sufficient justification for
discharging employees if the threat 'reasonably tended' to coerce or intimidate
[non-striking] employees in the exercise of their rights." Id.
175. Bruce E. Kaufman, Research on Strike Models and Outcomes in the 1980s:
Accomplishments and Shortcomings, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES 77-132 (David Lewin, Olivia S. Mitchell &
Peter D. Sherer eds., 1992).
176. Timothy J. Minchin, Permanent Replacements and the Breakdown of the
"Social Accord" in Calera, Alabama, 1974-1999, 41 LAB. HIST. 325, 372 (2001).
177. The main labor law reform being debated today, the Employee Free
Choice Act, makes no specific effort to redress the imbalances that have
effectively robbed workers of the power to strike. The EFCA campaign stresses
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By the early twenty-first century, two ironies were
clear. First, although private sector workers still possessed
the right to strike, their strikes had become as rare as pub-
lic sector strikes had been in the 1950s when they were il-
legal in every jurisdiction, before the bid to legitimize gov-
ernment strikes had begun. Second, the long struggle of
public workers to legitimize their right to strike had become
deeply entangled in the story of private sector workers'
rights to strike, and in unintended ways the public sector
workers' upsurge had helped trigger counterattacks that
suppressed strikes in both public and private sectors.
The long story that produced these twin ironies both
complicates and confirms the view of the law and its under-
lying assumptions that James Atleson laid out twenty-five
years ago. The history of the government workers' move-
ment reminds us that even apparently conservative con-
structions, such as the "weapons balancing' assumption at
the heart of the Mackay dictum, once harbored liberating
implications, at least for some workers-a factor that his fo-
cus on the private sector law led Atleson to overlook. More-
over, this story suggests that the impact of the law and the
significance of the assumptions that undergirded it could
change in different times and contexts: values and assump-
tions that proved oppressive in one context might prove li-
berating in another, and those that proved liberating in one
period might prove oppressive in another. The significance
of the values and assumptions that informed labor law was
determined by historical contingencies and contexts that
extended far beyond the courts and their rulings. Yet this
long story also confirms the basic truth of Atleson's argu-
ment over the long run. "No doctrine more readily reveals"
the impoverished nature of workers' rights under American
labor law, Atleson presciently wrote in 1983, than the
Mackay doctrine, which "mocks the protection of the right to
strike."' The events that have unfolded since then have
confirmed the wisdom of Atleson's observation-perhaps in
more emphatic ways than he could have ever foreseen. And,
as that important observation makes clear, those who seek
protecting the right to organize, but ignores the development of structural
impediments that have made the construction of workplace solidarity more
difficult. For a critique of that approach, see generally Joseph A. McCartin, Re-
Framing U.S. Labour's Crisis: Reconsidering Structure, Strategy, and Vision, 59
LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 133 (2007).
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to understand the near disappearance of the strike (or in-
deed the fate of U.S. labor in general over the last half cen-
tury) will continue to find in James Atleson's path-breaking
work insights worth pondering.

